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As Thucydides pointed out, hope is an expensive commodity.
It makes better sense to be prepared.
—Richard Preston, The Cobra Event
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Executive Summary
As follow-up to the National Health Policy Forum’s
February 1999 session entitled “Biological Terrorism: Is
the Health Care Community Prepared?” (Issue Brief 731),
the Forum organized a site visit on October 4 and 5, 1999,
to Baltimore and Fort Detrick, Maryland. The site visit,
“Preparing for a Bioterrorist Incident: Linking the Public
Health and Medical Communities,” provided federal congressional and agency staff with the opportunity to learn
first-hand how one local area is preparing for the possibility of a bioterrorist incident.
Several themes were stressed throughout the two days,
including the following:







Distinguishing bioterrorism from chemical terrorism.
Understanding the relationships between various agencies and institutions and their related funding streams.
Determining how the federal government can be most
effective and efficient in assisting those at the local level.
Identifying preparedness gaps and barriers to change.
Suggesting areas where the public health and medical
communities—the nations’s first lines of defense in the
event of a bioterrorist incident—can come together to
enhance their preparedness efforts.

The consensus from both the group of participants as well
as from the panelists was that, although numerous efforts are
under way, the United States is ill-prepared to handle
casualties from a weapons-of-mass-destruction scenario. Part
of the reason lies in the fact that bioterrorism is a relatively
nascent public health threat in the United States and presents
a significant learning curve. It is clear from NHPF’s site visit
that a great deal of work remains to be done. The benefits of
this work will be far-reaching: not only will the U.S. community be better prepared, but the basic public health infrastructure, which has deteriorated over the years and which forms
the foundation of bioterrorism preparedness, will be given a
much-needed boost.
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Preparing for a Bioterrorist
Incident: Linking the Public
Health & Medical Communities
BACKGROUND

PROGRAM

The nature of terrorism is changing. At the request of
Capitol Hill staff, the Forum held a meeting in February 1999
entitled “Biological Terrorism: Is the Health Care Community Prepared?” That session used the Institute of Medicine’s
1999 report “Chemical and Biological Terrorism: Research
and Development to Improve Civilian Medical Response” as
a springboard for understanding the role the health care
community must play in the event of a domestic biological
terrorist attack. Speakers—focusing primarily on bioterrorism, as opposed to chemical or radiologic terrorism—highlighted the issue of threat assessment and discussed
ways to improve the current level of preparedness as well as
steps needed to convert the public health system into the
nation’s best form of civil defense.

As the bus departed from Union Station in Washington,
D.C., participants were reminded of the difference between
chemical and bioterrorism agents and incidents, the variations in incident response plans, and the difficulties inherent
in answering questions such as: Who is in charge when an
incident occurs? Who is in charge of deciding who is in
charge? It quickly became clear from the briefing and the
questions that followed that confusion surrounds the chainof-command issue. It was pointed out, however, that this
should not necessarily be surprising, given that large-scale
U.S. bioterrorism scenarios are still theoretical.

Several meeting attendees requested that the Forum
arrange a follow-up site visit to see first-hand what was
happening at the local level. The Baltimore area was
selected because of its proximity to Fort Detrick’s U.S.
Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases
(USAMRIID) and because of its work on bioterrorism at
the local and state levels. In addition to visiting Baltimore,
the Forum wanted to highlight the work that is under way
at the Department of Veterans Affairs and its regional
links to local (Washington, D.C.) hospitals and Metropolitan Medical Strike Teams.

OBJECTIVES
Forum staff structured the site visit around the following themes:







Distinguishing bioterrorism from chemical terrorism.
Understanding the relationships between various agencies and institutions and their related funding streams.
Determining how the federal government can be most
effective and efficient in assisting those at the local level.
Identifying preparedness gaps and barriers to change.
Suggesting areas where the public health and medical
communities—the nations’s first lines of defense in the
event of a bioterrorist incident—can come together to
enhance their preparedness efforts.

Baltimore City Health Department:
Shoring Up the Public Health Infrastructure
In Baltimore, the site visit opened with a conversation
involving the staff of the 200-year-old Baltimore City
Health Department regarding the adequacy of the existing
public health infrastructure, including surveillance and
laboratory capabilities, emergency medical services and
communication technologies, the adequacy of mental
health services, and training and education programs.
It was explained that the health department’s role in
preparing for and responding to a bioterrorist incident is
that of the lead agency, a herculean task by any standard.
In the event of an incident, health department officials
would be called upon to determine how to verify the
biologic agent used, who is to be notified, and how they
are to be notified, as well as to track patients, establish
treatment sites, disperse pharmaceuticals and vaccines,
dispose of medical waste, provide public information,
coordinate treatment of the sick and worried well, and care
for the deceased. Additionally, the health department
would be responsible for the long-term tracking of survivors to address medical and mental health needs.

U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for
Infectious Diseases
The next stop was Fort Detrick, Maryland. Over lunch,
participants were briefed on the work under way at
USAMRIID. USAMRIID, which is part of the army’s
Medical Research and Materiel Command, is the lead
medical research laboratory for the U.S. Biological
1

Defense Research Program. USAMRIID conducts research to develop strategies, vaccines, drugs and diagnostics, information, procedures, and training programs for
medical defense against biological warfare threats and
infectious diseases.
A very important component of USAMRIID is its worldrenowned reference laboratory, which is designated by the
CDC as a reference laboratory for anthrax as well as by the
World Health Organization as a reference laboratory for
hemorrhagic fevers and arboviruses requiring high levels of
biological containment. Among its unique facilities,
USAMRIID contains 50,000 square feet of Biosafety Level
3 (containment) laboratory space and 10,000 square feet of
Biosafety Level 4 (maximum containment) laboratory space.
Arrangements were made for site visit participants to tour the
facility and its laboratories.

Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study
To explore interactions and links between local and state
health departments and between the departments and the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the second day
of the site visit opened with a briefing by Maryland Secretary
of Health and Mental Hygiene Georges C. Benjamin on
weapons of mass destruction. In his remarks, he reiterated
that bioterrorism is not new and can present as an overt
event, a covert release, or as threats and hoaxes. In any of
these circumstances, public health surveillance and reporting
are key. The ability to identify sentinel events is crucial, as
was made clear during the summer 1999 outbreak of West
Nile-Like Viral Encephalitis in New York State. As part of
the briefing, this outbreak was presented as a case study:
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August 23: An infectious disease physician reports to
the New York City Department of Health (NYCDOH)
two human encephalitis cases.
Upon investigation, NYCDOH initially identifies a
cluster of six cases.
August 30: Active surveillance by NYCDOH shows
more cases (eight in a two-square-mile area).
September 3: Active surveillance expands to Westchester and Nassau Counties.
Before and concurrent with this outbreak, local health
officials observe increased fatalities among New York
City birds, especially crows.
September 7–9: Exotic birds die at the Bronx Zoo.
Necropsy of birds shows encephalitis and myocarditis.
Initial diagnosis of St. Louis Encephalitis.
Actually the first U.S. cases of West Nile Encephalitis—surprise link to bird deaths.







Spread by common mosquito.
Disease now of epidemic proportions.
Threatens to move south through the U.S. as birds
migrate.
Media frenzy ensues.
Was this bioterrorism?

What was learned was disturbing. According to the
experts, although the West Nile incident was tiny, relative
to what is contemplated in a weapons-of-mass-destruction
scenario, it completely overwhelmed the public health
capacity in New York City, a city considered by many as
a model of bioterrorism preparedness.

Maryland Institute for Emergency Medical
Services Systems and University of Maryland
R Adams Cowley Shock Trauma Center
A portion of the second day was devoted to the communications and the emergency medical services coordination
that would be necessary in the event of either a bioterrorist
or chemical attack. The sophisticated communications
systems that would be employed are currently used by first
responders—such as emergency medical services and
hazardous material (HAZMAT) personnel—in emergency
medical situations and chemical incidents.
Participants toured both the Maryland Institute for
Emergency Medical Services System (MIEMSS) and the
University of Maryland’s R Adams Cowley Shock Trauma
Center and had an opportunity to see first-hand how critical
it is to have strong ties between emergency medical services
(EMS)—whose personnel are the first responders—and
health care facilities. As the lead emergency medical services
agency, MIEMSS provides state of the art “leadership,
direction, expertise, and coordination of resources to continuously improve the efficient and effective provision of EMS
throughout the state of Maryland.” Participants came away
very impressed with the level of sophistication and the
extensive planning that the MIEMSS staff have orchestrated.
The consensus among participants was that this is a model to
be emulated by other regions.

The Role of the Hospital: Johns Hopkins
A working lunch at the Johns Hopkins Hospital
focused on the role and readiness of a health care facility
in the midst of a bioterrorist event. The panel discussion
covered the waterfront of issues, which included the
medical management of over 100,000 patients, vaccination
and prophylaxis policy, the potential lack of adequate
resources—both supplies and personnel—and the need for
better coordination both inside and outside the hospital.
Throughout the site visit, almost all the speakers, including

the hospital panel, stressed that physicians today are not
trained to look for or think of diseases such as anthrax,
smallpox, or viral hemorrhagic fevers, thus making
containment much more difficult.
The hospital panelists made it clear that, in addition to
the daunting medical challenges that would present, should
a bioterrorist attack occur, there would also be significant
media, crowd control, health care worker protection, and
financial challenges facing hospital personnel.

Regional Links and the Role of the VA
The site visit concluded with a tour of the Veterans
Administration (VA) Medical Center in Washington, D.C.,
including its decontamination unit. After the tour, a panel
discussion included presentations highlighting the contributions the VA could make (for example, bed capacity,
vaccine stockpiles, medication caches, decontamination,
quarantine, and the use of the facility as a secured staging
area); the purpose, organization, and funding of Metropolitan Medical Strike Teams (MMST); and the relationship
between the VA, MMST, and area hospitals.
It was pointed out that the VA—with its workforce of
15,600 physicians, 1,100 dentists, 58,000 nurses, and
134,000 other staff and its 22,000 acres of land and 4,300
structures at nearly 1,000 locations—is what former Under
Secretary for Health Kenneth W. Kizer has called “the best
kept secret in American healthcare.” Panelists highlighted
that the VA serves as the primary contingency backup to the
Department of Defense medical care system and assists the
Public Health Service and the National Disaster Medical
System in providing emergency medical care to victims of
disaster. The devolution of the military health care system
will likely make this assistance an even higher priority in the
future, because the VA provides many of the physical
resources needed to make federal disaster plans work.

IMPRESSIONS
At a post-site visit debriefing held in Washington, D.C.,
federal participants had the opportunity to reflect on what
they learned. Their observations and impressions are
summarized below.

The United States is not prepared for a
large-scale bioterrorist incident.
The U.S. civilian health care community—medical and
public health—will be woefully unprepared to handle all
aspects of a weapons of mass destruction scenario:
Pre-event. Surveillance, physician and laboratory expertise and facilities capable of identifying rare and exotic

agents, vaccine and other pharmaceutical/supply stockpiles, information sharing, and training are currently
inadequate.
During the event. The chain of command is currently
unclear, and treatment capabilities, prophylaxis, disaster
management, media management, health care facility
capacity, and the ability to handle the worried well are
inadequate.
Post-event. Methods and resources for disposing of the
deceased (physically and with respect to religious and
cultural sensitivities) and meeting mental health needs of
civilians, including health care and first responder personnel, are currently inadequate.
Reaction to a bioterrorist threat would be very different
from that required by a chemical attack or major accident.
Nevertheless, responders would need to draw on existing
expertise, relationships, and infrastructure. Most of these,
however, are underfunded, understaffed, and ill-equipped to
handle the day-to-day activities on a routine basis.
Compounding the problem is the cultural and communication gap and lack of coordination between the medical
community and public health community, not just in
preparing for bioterrorism but in day to day reporting,
surveillance, and diagnosis. For example, some of the
speakers underscored the lack of knowledge on required
reporting to the local health department and to internal
infection control programs on the part of emergency
department personnel, private practitioners (hospital and
non-hospital based), and attending physicians. Likewise,
there exists an insufficient reporting system from hospitals
to local health departments. In Baltimore, the current
practice involves waiting for lab referrals for reportable
diseases or reliance on a physician with third-world
biological disease knowledge to establish a diagnosis and
report it to the local health department.
Challenges exist within individual health care facilities as
well. It became clear that, although internal hospital committees have been formed and that staff take the possibility of a
bioterrorist incident seriously, current hospital disaster plans
make insufficient allowance for the likely tremendous patient
(and worried well) volume as well as inadequate preparation
for the unique aspects of such a disaster. Several panelists
throughout the two days mentioned that more education and
closer working relationships between the public health and
medical communities would go a long way toward minimizing some of these inadequacies. For example, a number of
participants repeatedly emphasized the need within the medical community for extensive training in the issues surrounding chemical and biological agents, including reporting
requirements, where to call for assistance, and what to expect
within the first 24, 48, and 72 hours from local and state
health departments.
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Efforts to identify best solutions and appropriate players need to intensify.
Based upon what was learned during the site visit, it
became clear that the number of technical and political
problems to overcome is staggering. For example, the
preparedness efforts to date tend to be nonintegrated piecemeal approaches or fixes. No systematic plan for preparedness exists. Everywhere, participants found a need for
improvement of coordination at and among all three levels of
government—local, state and federal—as well as among and
between the public and the private sectors. In addition, health
planning will need to be superimposed over a market-based
system, and provisions for access to the health care system
(despite the limits of insurance) will be paramount.
Responding to such challenges, many hardworking,
dedicated people have committed themselves to preparing
for a bioterrorist attack. The site visit highlighted several
steps, some already under way, that hold promise. These
include the following:
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Defining the base capability necessary.
Agreeing upon uniform standards and case definitions.
Developing standardized fact sheets for use by health
care personnel as well as the media. Developing a
national Web site listing best practices.
Constructing one standardized disaster plan that allows
for local flexibility (rather than each agency and professional association developing separate ones), addressing
issues such as who is to receive prophylaxis and when,
what to do and who is in charge during the first hours
until help arrives, and how to deal with crowd control.
Articulating the role of the federal government in
knowledge development and transfer.
Overcoming turf problems and clarifying the roles of
all players. Figuring out now, in advance of an incident,
the legal authority determining who is in charge under
different scenarios.
Reforming public health laws to address bioterrorism
concerns.
Working out a shared financing strategy for all levels
of government, as well as the private sector.
Building upon and improving resource platforms that
currently exist, such as USAMRIID, the VA’s national
database of specific experts, the National Disaster
Medical System, and CDC’s databases and laboratories.
Improving the efficiency and logistics of moving large
quantities of reagents, medicines, and vaccines quickly
and safely.






Closing the gaps that exist between the medical and
public health communities. Encouraging the American
Medical Association and the American Hospital
Association to take a greater leadership position.
Improving public health linkages with intelligence
agencies, poison control centers, veterinarians, first
responders, mental health care workers, clergy, and
national experts and resources. (Establishing toll-free
numbers with a single point of entry has been found to
be extremely helpful.)
Improving reporting speed and accuracy of communicable diseases and cluster outbreaks to public health
departments.
Planning, communication, training (for all personnel—from mail room staff to hospital volunteers, clerks,
and health care personnel), and often repeated testing.

ISSUES FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION
As part of their evaluation of the site visit, federal
participants were asked what questions were raised during
the two days that they would like the Forum to pursue.
These were their replies:







Where do we go from here?
What is the responsibility of providers to protect the
public health in the event of a catastrophe: Who will be
the “smallpox hospital”?
How do other states and regions compare in readiness
to Baltimore?
What are the roles and responsibilities of the federal,
state, and local governments, given the diminished
capability of public health over the past 15 years?
Who is in charge? How are the various federal agencies
coordinated, including nonhealth agencies such as the
Department of Justice, the Department of Energy, the
Department of Transportation, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Federal Emergency Management Agency, the State
Department, the National Security Council, the military, and the White House? How are they coordinated
with state and local officials?

Agenda
Monday, October 4, 1999
8:15 am

Board bus at Union Station, Washington, D.C. (box breakfast provided)

8:30 am

Departure for Baltimore (briefing en route)
OVERVIEW: THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CHEMICAL AND BIOTERRORISM AGENTS AND
INCIDENTS; DIFFERENT TYPES OF INCIDENT RESPONSE PLANS; WHO’S IN CHARGE?
WHO’S IN CHARGE OF DECIDING WHO’S IN CHARGE?
Frederick J. Manning, Ph.D., Senior Program Officer, Health Science Policy Program,
Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences

10:00 am

Presentation and discussion [Maxi Collier Conference Room, Baltimore City Health Department]
SHORING UP THE PUBLIC HEALTH INFRASTRUCTURE
Peter Beilenson, M.D., M.P.H., Commissioner of Health, Baltimore City Health Department
Irene Lumpkins, Director, Field Health Services, and Chair, Health and Safety Remediation
Committee for the Domestic Preparedness Program

11:00 am

Coffee break

11:30 am

Question and answer session

Noon

Departure for Fort Detrick, Maryland

1:30 pm

Working lunch and briefing [Dalrymple Conference Room, Building 1425, U.S. Army Medical Research
Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID)]
USAMRIID: A UNIQUE NATIONAL RESOURCE
Lt. Col. George W. Korch, Jr., Ph.D., Deputy Commander, USAMRIID
Comdr. Randall C. Culpepper, U.S. Navy Medical Corps, Assistant Chief,
Operational Medicine Division, USAMRIID
Lt. Col. Erik A. Henchal, Ph.D., Chief, Diagnostic Systems Division, USAMRIID

2:15 pm

Tour of USAMRIID facility and labs

3:00 pm

Departure for headquarters hotel

4:30 pm

Check-in, Admiral Fell Inn, Fells Point, Baltimore

6:00 pm

Reception [Rooftop Terrace, Admiral Fell Inn]

7:00 pm

Dinner [Captain’s Room, Admiral Fell Inn]

Tuesday, October 5, 1999
7:30 am

Breakfast [Mitchell/Moran Room, Admiral Fell Inn] and checkout

8:30 am

Bus departure for Maryland Institute for Emergency Medical Services Systems (MIEMSS)
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9:00 am

Briefing [Room 212, Conference Center, MIEMSS]
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
Georges C. Benjamin, M.D., Secretary, Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene

9:30 am

Question and answer session

9:45 am

Tour of MIEMSS facility
Richard L. Alcorta, M.D., EMS Medical Director, State of Maryland

10:45 am

Coffee break

11:00 am

Tour of University of Maryland Trauma Center
Thomas M. Scalea, M.D., Chief of Trauma and Critical Care, and Physician in Chief,
R Adams Cowley Shock Trauma Center, University of Maryland Medical System
Carnell Cooper, M.D., Assistant Professor, General Surgery, University of Maryland School of
Medicine, and Trauma Surgeon, R Adams Cowley Shock Trauma Center, University of Maryland
Medical System

12:30 pm

Departure for Johns Hopkins University Hospital

1:00 pm

Working lunch and panel discussion [Smith Room (212), Billings Administration Building]
THE ROLE OF THE HOSPITAL
John G. Bartlett, M.D., Chief, Division of Infectious Diseases, Johns Hopkins University Hospital,
and Co-Director, Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies
Trish Perl, M.D., M.Sc., Assistant Professor, Division of Infectious Diseases, and
Hospital Epidemiologist, Johns Hopkins University Hospital
Christina L. Catlett, M.D., Assistant Chief of Service, Department of Emergency Medicine,
Johns Hopkins University Hospital
Gary M. Stephenson, M.S., Associate Director for Media Relations, Johns Hopkins University Hospital

2:00 pm

Question and answer session

2:30 pm

Departure for Veterans Administration Medical Center, Washington, D.C.

4:00 pm

Tour of Decontamination Unit [Veterans Administration Medical Center]
Philip A. Forbes, Lead Area Emergency Manager, Washington, D.C., Department of Veterans Affairs
Kenneth A. Steadman, M.D., Emergency Physician, Veterans Administration Medical Center, and
Chair, Emergency Preparedness Committee, Washington Veterans Administration Hospital

5:00 pm

Panel discussion [Room 4A138, Abraham Lincoln Auditorium, Veterans Administration Medical Center]
REGIONAL LINKAGE AND THE ROLE OF THE VA
Kristi L. Koenig, M.D., Director, Emergency Management Strategic Healthcare Group, and
Principal Advisor on Emergency Management and Disaster Medicine, Department of Veterans Affairs
Joseph A. Barbera, M.D., Director of Disaster Medicine, George Washington University Hospital
William M. Moultrie, Captain, Arlington County Fire Department, and Program Manager,
Metropolitan Medical Strike Team
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6:00 pm

Bus departure for Union Station, Washington, D.C.

7:00 pm

Arrival at Union Station
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Biographical Sketches—
Speakers and Panelists
Richard L. Alcorta, M.D., is medical director for Maryland Emergency Medical Services as well as an emergency
specialist/physician paramedic liaison at Suburban Hospital in Bethesda. A fellow of the American College of
Emergency Physicians, Dr. Alcorta received his M.D.
degree from the Howard University School of Medicine in
Washington, D.C. He is certified as a Maryland State EMT
paramedic instructor, a hospital hazardous material instructor, and an advanced trauma life support instructor. He has
received numerous awards, including the Governor’s
Salute to Excellence from Gov. William D. Schaefer.
Joseph A. Barbera, M.D., is director of disaster medicine
at George Washington University Hospital, where he also
serves as a member of the Medical Faculty Associates
Productivity Committee. In his additional capacity as an
assistant professor at the university’s School of Medicine,
Dr. Barbera provides the Emergency Medicine Morning
Conference Lecture Series and serves as guest lecturer for
the Disaster Response Planning and Management Conference. He also served as the primary author of “Urban Search
and Rescue Medical Team Training Course,” the “gold
standard” four-day curriculum taught to all physicians and
paramedics participating in the Federal Emergency Management Administration National Urban Search and Rescue
System, and established the National Capital EMS and
Disaster Medicine Fellowship. Dr. Barbera’s current appointments include medical officer, Office of U.S. Foreign
Disaster Assistance, Agency for International Development,
International Search and Rescue Team, and advisor, Office
of the Attending Physician, United States Capitol. Dr.
Barbera’s community service includes being medical team
manager for the Fairfax County Urban Search and Rescue
Task Force and chair of the Emergency Preparedness
Committee of the District of Columbia Hospital Association.
John G. Bartlett, M.D., is chief of the Division of
Infectious Diseases and director of the AIDS Care Program at Johns Hopkins Hospital. In addition, Dr. Bartlett
serves as co-director of the Johns Hopkins Center for
Civilian Biodefense Studies. After graduating from
Dartmouth and receiving his M.D. degree from Upstate
Medical Center in Syracuse, New York, Dr. Bartlett served
on a fever ward in Vietnam. He completed his infectious
disease training at Brigham Hospital in Boston and at
UCLA and later moved to the Boston Veterans’ Administration Hospital.

Peter Beilenson, M.D., M.P.H.,was appointed commissioner of Health for Baltimore City by Mayor Kurt L.
Schmoke in 1992. He is responsible for health policy for
the city and for the management of a $160 million budget
and 1,300 employees. In 1996 Dr. Beilenson was recognized nationally by his peers as the first-ever recipient of
the Milton and Ruth Roemer Award for creativity by a
local health official. In 1998, he received the Laughlin
Distinguished Public Officer Award from the Medical and
Chirurgical Faculty of Maryland, the state medical society.
Dr. Beilenson graduated cum laude from Harvard College
and earned his medical degree from Emory University. He
received his M.P.H. degree from Johns Hopkins in 1990
while completing his residency in preventive medicine.
Georges C. Benjamin, M.D., was appointed secretary of
Health and Mental Hygiene by Gov. Parris N. Glendening,
effective May 1, 1999. He oversees an agency with more
than 10,000 employees and a $3.7 billion budget. Dr.
Benjamin is a graduate of the Illinois Institute of Technology and the University of Illinois College of Medicine. He
is board certified in internal medicine and is a fellow of
the American College of Physicians. His early career
experience includes serving in administrative positions as
chief of the Acute Illness Clinic at Madigan Army Medical Center, chief of Emergency Medicine at Walter Reed
Army Medical Center, chairman of the Department of
Community Health and Ambulatory Care at the District of
Columbia General Hospital, and health commissioner for
the District of Columbia. Dr. Benjamin leads the state’s
public health efforts to combat biological and chemical
terrorism and was a member of the Institutes of Medicine’s committee on Research and Development Needs for
Improving Civilian Medical Response to Chemical and
Biological Terrorism Incidents.
Christina L. Catlett, M.D., is assistant chief of service in
the Department of Emergency Medicine at Johns Hopkins
Hospital. While infectious disease specialists would deal
with the early stages of a biological attack, emergency
physicians would be called to triage and treat patients if an
outbreak spreads. Dr. Catlett is an emergency medicine
specialist who spends time thinking about and planning
for such a scenario. She has published articles and made
presentations on the topic and has taken part in a U.S
Army hospital training program for biological, chemical,
and nuclear warfare. She serves on the Hopkins Bioterror9

ism Response Task Force, charged with planning for such
an attack, and is a consultant to the Johns Hopkins Center
for Civilian Biodefense Studies. Dr. Catlett received her
M.D. degree from the University of North Carolina.
Comdr. Randall C. Culpepper, U.S. Navy Medical
Corps, is currently stationed at the U.S. Army Medical
Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) at
Fort Detrick, Maryland. USAMRIID conducts research to
develop vaccines, drugs, and diagnostics to protect U.S.
service members from biological warfare threats and
endemic infectious diseases. Comdr. Culpepper serves as
assistant chief of USAMRIID’s Operational Medicine
Division and heads the institute’s education and training
programs, lecturing and consulting extensively on the
medical management of biological warfare and terrorism
casualties. Commander Culpepper graduated from the
University of Colorado School of Medicine in 1984.
Following his internship at Naval Hospital Jacksonville, he
completed flight surgeon training at the Naval Aerospace
Medical Institute at Naval Air Station (NAS) Pensacola
and a tour with Patrol Squadron Twenty-Four at NAS
Jacksonville. He completed his residency in general
preventive medicine and public health at the University of
Washington in Seattle while also earning a master’s degree
in public health. His previous duty assignments include
head of occupational health/preventive medicine, Naval
Hospital Great Lakes; officer in charge, Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit 7 in Italy, and head
of quality management, Naval Hospital Sigonella.
Philip A. Forbes is the Department of Veterans’ Affairs
(DVA) area emergency manager for Washington, D.C.,
and is responsible for a wide spectrum of emergency
management issues. Mr. Forbes serves on several committees and task forces and in October 1998 was appointed to
serve on the mayor’s District of Columbia Emergency
Medical Services Advisory Committee. Mr. Forbes is a
1999 graduate of the U.S. Army Chemical Warfare
School. Prior to his work at the DVA, Mr. Forbes served
as a contractor to the U.S. Customs Service where he was
the senior management analyst and project leader for the
Aerostat Joint Program Office. The Aerostat Program
consisted of high-altitude surveillance by balloon to aid
law enforcement officials in drug interdiction efforts along
the southwest border of the United States. Mr. Forbes
served from 1960 to 1984 in the U.S. Marine Corps and
had several overseas tours: two in Vietnam and one each
in Santa Domingo, Cuba, and Okinawa. He is the recipient
of eight awards for valor, including two Purple Hearts.
Kristi L. Koenig, M.D., a board-certified emergency
physician, is director of the Emergency Management
Strategic Healthcare Group, where she serves as the
principal advisor on emergency management and disaster
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medicine to the Office of the Under Secretary for Health,
Veterans Health Administration in the Department of
Veterans Affairs. Dr. Koenig’s previous professional
experience includes serving as the director of prehospital
and disaster medicine, Alameda County Medical Center,
in Oakland, California, and associate professor on the
emergency medicine faculty at the University of
California-San Francisco. She spent time as a consultant
in the Accident and Emergency Department at St.
George’s Hospital National Health Service Trust in
London, England, where she held positions as co-director
of the Emergency Department, director of undergraduate
teaching, and honorary senior lecturer at the University of
London. Dr. Koenig is an honors graduate in applied
mathematics from the University of California-San Diego
and received her medical degree from the Mount Sinai
School of Medicine in New York.
Lt. Col. Erik A. Henchal, U.S. Army Medical Service
Corps, is chief, Diagnostic Systems Division, USAMRIID.
In addition, he is a research coordinator for Common
Diagnostic Systems for the U.S. Army Medical Research
and Materiel Command. Lt. Col. Henchal received his Ph.D.
degree in microbiology from the Pennsylvania State University. He has served in positions of increasing responsibility
in the U.S. Army, which included work in Africa, Thailand,
and Germany. His research has focused on developing
improved diagnostic assays and reagents for diseases of
military importance. He is an author or co-author on more
than 27 scientific papers.
Lt. Col. George W. Korch, Jr., is deputy commander of
USAMRIID at Fort Detrick, Maryland. Prior to assuming
that post, he served as chief of USAMRIID’s Virology
Division from 1996 to 1999. Earlier in his career, he held
the positions of research entomologist and chief of the
Rapid Diagnosis Department at the institute. Other
assignments have included staff officer, Medical Biological Defense Research Program, U.S. Army Medical
Research and Materiel Command; Lyme Disease program
manager, U.S. Army Environmental Hygiene Agency; and
commander, Fifth Medical Detachment, Seoul, Korea. Lt.
Col. Korch holds a Ph.D. from the Johns Hopkins University School of Hygiene and Public Health. His scientific
specialties include mammalogy and entomology; he has
conducted research on hantaviruses and rickettsial diseases.
Irene Theresa Lumpkins has held the position of director, field health services/medical assistance transportation,
Baltimore City Health Department, for seven years. She
also serves as chairperson, Health and Safety Remediation
Committee, Domestic Preparedness Program, and chairperson, Biological Metropolitan Medical Record
Response System. Previous positions include 5 years as

licensing officer, Commercial Ambulance Services, and 12
years as director, Emergency Medical Services Team.
Frederick J. Manning, Ph.D., is a senior program officer
in the Health Science Policy Program at the Institutes of
Medicine (IOM). In six years at IOM, he has served as
study director for projects addressing a variety of topics
ranging from medical isotopes to potential hepatitis drugs,
blood safety and availability, rheumatic disease, and
resource sharing in biomedical research. Most recently, Dr.
Manning served as study director for an IOM project that
resulted in a report entitled “Chemical and Biological
Terrorism: Research and Development to Improve Civilian
Medical Response.” Prior to joining IOM, Dr. Manning
spent 25 years in the U.S. Army Medical Research and
Development Command, serving in positions that included
director of neuropsychiatry at the Walter Reed Army
Institute of Research and chief research psychologist for
the Army Medical Department. Dr. Manning earned his
Ph.D. degree in psychology from Harvard University.
Capt. William “Mike” Moultrie is a 27- year veteran of
the Arlington County Fire Department. For the past seven
years he has served as the deputy coordinator of emergency services. He is a certified emergency manager with
the International Association of Emergency Managers in
Falls Church, Virginia, and a Virginia state-certified
hazardous materials technician. Captain Moultrie is the
program manager for the Washington-area Metropolitan
Medical Strike Team and currently serves as an assistant
task force leader and lead instructor for the team, the first
of its type in the nation. In addition, he is a senior instructor for the federal Domestic Preparedness Training Program, providing training to first responders across the
nation. Captain Moultrie led the team that has developed
an improved method of providing mass casualty decontamination for weapons of mass destruction incidents. This
new method was first tried in “Exercise Cloudy Office” at
the Pentagon in May 1998.
Col. Gerald W. Parker, D.V.M., is commander of
USAMRIID at Fort Detrick, Maryland. Prior to assuming
command of USAMRIID in March 1998, Colonel Parker
served in a variety of assignments throughout his 20-year
army career, including research area director for the
Medical Chemical and Biological Defense Research
Program at the U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel
Command. Colonel Parker’s military awards include the
Meritorious Service Medal with three oak leaf clusters, the
Army Commendation Medal with two oak leaf clusters,
and the Overseas Ribbon. He is a recipient of the Surgeon
General’s “A” Proficiency Designator in Physiology.
Colonel Parker holds a D.V.M. degree from Texas A&M
University and a Ph.D. in physiology from Baylor College
of Medicine.

Trish Perl, M.D., M.Sc, is an assistant professor in the
Division of Infectious Diseases and hospital epidemiologist at Johns Hopkins Hospital. Dr. Perl has devoted her
career to tracking and preventing hospital-based and
hospital-acquired infections. Her concern for the increasing problem of hospital-based outbreaks spurred her to
help establish guidelines for preventing the spread of
antibiotic-resistant organisms—the so-called “superbugs.”
Dr. Perl is also an expert in general infectious disease
treatment and tropical infectious diseases. She received
her M.D. degree from the University of North Carolina
and earned her M.Sc. from McGill University. Dr. Perl is
also a member of the Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian
Biodefense Studies.
Thomas M. Scalea, M.D., F.A.C.S., F.C.C.M., has been
physician-in-chief at the R Adams Cowley Shock Trauma
Center and chief of trauma and critical care since 1997.
He also holds the following positions at the University of
Maryland at Baltimore: professor of surgery; chief,
Division of Trauma Surgery, Department of Surgery; and
director, Program in Traumatology. He graduated from the
Medical College of Virginia in 1978 and served his
internship in medicine and surgery at St. Joseph's Hospital
in Syracuse, New York, and his residency and chief
residency in surgery at Upstate Medical Center, Syracuse.
Gary M. Stephenson, M.S., is associate director for
media relations at Johns Hopkins Hospital. Dealing with
the media and getting accurate information to the public
during a bioterrorism attack is the responsibility of
hospital and government public relations officials. As an
award-winning former medical and science journalist, Mr.
Stephenson understands how reporters work and knows
how to present critical information to the public. The work
that he and others in similar positions do in conveying the
concerns and cautions of hospital staff may make the
difference between an isolated outbreak and widespread
mayhem. Mr. Stephenson joined Hopkins in 1996 after
serving in a similar position at the University of Maryland
at College Park. His news beats at Hopkins include the
business of medicine and the areas of re-engineering,
outcomes research, clinical practice guidelines, and
corporate communications. He also serves on the Hopkins
Bioterrorism Response Task Force.
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